In Re Estate of Wilson, A-5350-18T2

From the Right Result Wrong Reasoning department:

Before diving headfirst into the humor, a quick review of probate law. Because nothing helps a joke along like a couple paragraphs about how the legal system handles arguments over dead people's money.

Undue influence is a thing because Sometimes people create a will that they don't really want. For example, they make make a will because their caretaker pressures them to write a will in favor of the caretaker. Undue influence requires (1) a confidential relationship, and (2) suspicious circumstances. A confidential relationship can be shown by the person depending on the caretaker while being isolated with them. Suspicious circumstances is more nebulous, and is, broadly speaking, anything that makes the trial court go, "Dun, dun, dun!"

With that in mind, let's look at this case: Decedent (legalese for "the dead guy") married a second wife in 1990. When he died in 2016, he had written a series of recent wills that ended up giving most of his assets to his second wife, who (reading in between the lines) was also his caretaker.

However, there was voluminous evidence that Decedent knew what he was doing each time he changed his will and that it was his own free choice. (Holy crap, there was evidence: Even the summary was long. Defendant's attorney did a good job here.) 

This brings us to the trial court's analysis of undue influence, which, for those of you inclined towards sleep right how, is the humorous part:

The judge explained "[n]one of the evidence presented to the [c]ourt demonstrates that the character of the relationship between Stuart and Amelia was any different than one would expect from any other marriage of some period of time–this was over [twenty] years[.]" The judge found "the actions between Stuart and Amelia, most especially over the last four or five years of the relationship [prior to] Stuart's death, just evidences to the [c]ourt a natural [marital] relationship. The actions taken by Amelia did not demonstrate to the [c]ourt any confidential relationship."

[Emphasis added.]

Hold up folks! She was his caretaker! She wheeled him around in his old man wheelchair! If he ever drooled, she wiped his old man drool! Those Venn diagrams ('wife' and 'confidential relationship') frequently overlap!

So now you can see why the plaintiff appealed this case. There was obviously a confidential relationship!

But you can also see why the Appellate Division responded with, 'Meh, affirmed,' rather than correct the trial court's reasoning: The trial court's point is clear in context.

Johnson v. US Bank, A-3637-19

From the Aren't Banks Supposed to Make Money department:

While a foreclosure is pending, the deadbeat owner signs a rent agreement with an option to purchase. Renter eventually tries to exercise the option at $437,500 and $500,000. Bank ignores him and sells the house for $370,000.

DCPP v. E.K., A-1486-19

Family consists of mother, father, and 2 kids. Parents are separated. Mom has a DUI, so Dad drives the family to a holiday gathering at Mom's relatives' home on Christmas day.

Mom has several drinks, and they leave around 10:30 PM with the kids in the back seat. Mom gives Dad driving directions, but he makes some wrong turns so he switches on his GPS. Bad move. She hits him in the face. On the Turnpike by now, Dad pulls over to the shoulder. 

Mom decides to jump off a bridge, literally, and rushes from the car to try to throw herself off an overpass. Fortunately, she gets stuck on the 3 1/2 foot wall. (Remember, she had several drinks.)

Dad goes after her, tries sweet reason, and, when that doesn't work, bear hugs her and drags her back to the car, at which point she gathers her things that fell on the ground during her hasty exit.

Then she decides to run again, this time to the Turnpike median. Dad gives chase again and drags Mom, who is not resisting, back to the car. Dad is almost hit by an oncoming car and turned into roadkill. 

They drive off, Mom hits Dad 4 more times, Dad unsuccessfully tries to call 911 more than once, and Dad drives to a police station rather than the family home.

All in all a successful Christmas!

PUBLISHED: Winberry Realty Partnership v. Borough of Rutherford, A-22/53-19

 In which the New Jersey Supreme Court holds that even an idiot government employee* should know that the tax collector can't tell someone 'I don't want your filthy money'.

* The standard for denying qualified immunity is whether every government employee should know the right at issue is clearly established (even the stupid ones).

PUBLISHED: Romero v. Gold Star Distribution LLC, A-0379-20

Mixed martial art (MMA) fighter takes a dietary supplement, which totally does not have any banned ingredients. Except it does. And he flunks a drug test and gets disciplined. He sues the sketchy dietary supplement company, which doesn't answer the complaint. He eventually gets a default judgment for $27 million.

OK, enforcement time. After the defendant was held in contempt for failing to comply with post-judgment discovery, the CEO, Hankin, deigned to talk about settlement in exchange for a pause in enforcement:

Thereafter, Hankin initiated a number of unprofessional email communications with plaintiff's counsel and in a February 19, 2020 email insinuated that a female associate employed at the firm, who was not working on the matter, fly across the country, meet him for dinner, and discuss a potential settlement of the matter.

Pro tip: Do not do this, if for no other reason than:

Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel declined to engage in any further communication with Hankin following his February 19, 2020 email.

Despite this, the opinion was a qualified win for the defendant: The Appellate Division knocked $6 million off the value of the judgment, and remanded for the trial court to determine whether to remove another $9 million!

PUBLISHED: J.K. v. Rowling, June 24, 2021

In 2015, a sex offender subject to parole for life applied to move back to Poland. The Parole Board didn't have a procedure for this, leading to a marvelous legal quagmire. Eventually, the case landed on the lap of the New Jersey Supreme Court because the State was insisting that sex offenders don't get to relocate internationally.

But it turned out that the Parole Board had promulgated regulations to deal with the situation in 2020. (Yes, it only took 5 years.)

But the State didn't bother to tell the New Jersey Supreme Court about the new regulations. Alas, that task fell to our long-suffering sex offender. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:

We learned of the existence of that Policy only through the happenstance of petitioner’s unearthing of it during the pendency of this appeal. 

This happened "[i]mmediately prior to oral argument". The State, keeping it classy, immediately changed its argument to say that the Parole Board's regulations were beyond the scope of the Parole Board's authority.

The New Jersey Supreme Court's response was, "Ha, ha, guys, but you are wasting our time. Seriously." Though, naturally, because they have to use the vernacular of judicial opinions, it was couched in phrases like:

The argument that the Attorney General advances at this stage of this appeal--on behalf of an agency that determined to adopt the Policy--is unusual.

State v. Li, A-1834-19

OK, let's check the evidence the State presented that Defendant poisoned her husband:

[A] contentious divorce between defendant Tianle Li and her husband, Xiaoye Wang; 

defendant's prior threats to poison her husband; 

defendant's access to thallium through her work at Bristol-Myers Squibb; her initial denial of access to thallium; records showing the thallium bottles ordered by defendant were returned to storage with less content than when defendant received them despite other records showing defendant never used any thallium in the chemical reactions she performed at work; 

articles about thallium found in defendant's laptop case; 

defendant's booking of one-way flights to China for her and her son; and 

defendant's admission to her cellmate that she had poisoned her husband with the thallium she obtained from work, 

[Paragraphination adjusted.]

 Several things struck me from this list:

1. Don't go around telling the intended victim, "I'm totally going to poison you." Because then, when the victim keels over, people totally think you poisoned him.
2. Please do not research your intended murder method on the internet. That is the sort of thing that cops check for. (This is not an endorsement of unresearched murder methods, either.)
3. The defendant knows chemistry and couldn't think of something better to use than thallium? This is what Wikipedia says about thallium: "Because of its historic popularity as a murder weapon, thallium has gained notoriety as "the poisoner's poison" and "inheritance powder" (alongside arsenic)." Yeah, no one doing an autopsy is ever going to check for that.

(I don't fault her for her alleged admission to her cellmate because that's the type of things that cellmates state whether or not it actually happened.)

State v. Abdullah, A-3723-17

From the It Was a Night of Consistently Poor Judgment department:

Case is an reckless manslaughter case. Defendant was in the same strip club earlier in the night as the victim. The cause for the shooting?

The State alleges that defendant got angry with Jay because he thought his girlfriend, J.G. (Julie), and Jay were flirting at an exotic dance club (the Club).

So, as I understand conventional wisdom:

1. Don't bring your girlfriend to a strip club.
2. If you do bring your girlfriend to a strip club, don't shoot anyone.
   

Hunt-Irving v. Espada, A-0375-19

If you're suing your much younger ex-girlfriend for stealing about $2,000, please remember to bring your documentation to trial, especially the text messages where she actually said something. 

Because otherwise, if the trial judge finds every witness either lacking credibility or clueless, you will lose your case because you have the burdens of production and persuasion.

Also, if you ever wanted to see the phrase "sugar daddy" in an appellate opinion, this is the case for you.

Lawnick v. Smith, A-2580-19

Dear Litigants:

Once you have settled your case, please do not move for summary judgment, even if the court forgot to serve you with a copy of the settlement order. The case has settled. 

If you feel compelled to move for summary judgment, please do not move for reconsideration. The case has settled. 

If you feel compelled to move for reconsideration, please do not appeal. The case has settled.

Huggies,

The Appellate Division

State v. A.F., A-2610-17

You may be thinking that I've listed this case because the defendant managed to have the Appellate Division affirm her being sentenced one degree lower than her crime with the presumption of incarceration overcome, because that's a unicorn there.

No, this is about procedural history, specifically, the Appellate Division getting annoyed at everyone for getting it wrong because of a trial court error:

On March 2, 2018, the court entered a judgment of conviction memorializing the resentencing. While the judgment of conviction was signed and filed on March 2, 2018, its first page is dated February 28, 2018. This explains conflicting resentencing dates in the parties' subsequent filings.

 

 

State v. Carmichael, A-2271-18

From the It's Not What You Say department:

This is a rather pedestrian motor vehicle traffic stop, leading to the smell of marijuana, leading to a vehicle search, leading to the cops finding both marijuana and drugs besides marijuana, and finally leading to the State convicting the driver. But wait! The officer needed to have a basis for the traffic stop, and the defendant demands his hearing.

Take 1: The State doesn't provide a basis for the traffic stop.

Not a problem. The court reopens the hearing for the State, leading us to:

Take 2: The State doesn't provide a basis for the traffic stop.

Not a problem! The trial judge, seeing this, questions the officer personally until the trial judge feels that there's a basis for the traffic stop, and writes a 19 page opinion about it.

This was a bridge too far for the Appellate Division, because the tenor of the trial judge's questions:

We acknowledge that a judge, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 614(b), may examine witnesses to clarify testimony, aid the court's understanding, elicit material facts, and assure the trial is conducted efficiently. State v. Medina, 349 N.J. Super. 108, 131 (App. Div. 2002). Here, however, the motion judge engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Principato wherein he interposed suggestive and leading questions. A judge must avoid crossing "that fine line that separates advocacy from impartiality. When that occurs there may be substantial prejudice to the rights of one of the litigants." Ridgewood v. SreelInv. Corp., 28 N.J. 121, 132 (1958). 

So if the judge feels like reopening the hearing when the State has rested rather than ruling against it? That's just dandy. Carry on, good sir or madame, impartiality in action. However, in that reopened hearing the trial judge better be careful how he or she words any questions he or she asks.

 

State v. Brown, A-5386-17

From the Another Day at the Office department: 

Someone overdosed on drugs. The police, noticing texts on the dead guy's phone the police believed were with the dead guy's drug dealer, pretended to be the dead guy and invited the supposed drug dealer to bring some more product to the dead guy's house to sell to the dead guy. 

As recounted in the opinion, the bust culminated in the following exchange. In it, "Neiber" is the cop pretending to be the dead guy and "1129" is the suspected dealer coming to make a delivery:

Neiber:  Come around back.  

1129:  Huh?

Neiber:  Around my house.

At  that  point,  defendant  exited his  car  and  walked  toward  the  back  of  Levine's residence and was confronted by a SWAT team. 

So basically, the cops tell the dealer, 'bring the stuff around back', and when the guy comes around back with a rather pedestrian amount of drugs, BOOM, SWAT TEAM.

A.J.L. v. C.L., A-0499-20

From the Overcoming through Incompetence department:

COVID-19 Zoom domestic violence hearing. Defendant does not speak English well, but refuses to use the court-appointed Mandarin translator. There are 126 instances in the transcript marked "unintelligible".

Result: Reversed and remanded for a new hearing.

State v. Harden, A-5935-17

From the Don't Do Things From Memory department:

Normally, when the jury says they're deadlocked, the trial court will read a very carefully worded charge that says, in essence, "You totally are entitled to your honest opinions, but can you reach deep into your hearts and see if you can find any agreement, uh, without violating your beliefs, of course. Wink. Wink. No pressure." Juries typically get the subtext and resolve the deadlock.

Here, the judge instead stated, "You have an obligation to deliberate and to reach a unanimous verdict. That's your obligation. I'm going to send you back in. I'm going to ask you to continue your deliberations."  The jury happily obliged. 

And the Appellate Division, much less happily, reversed.

State v. Hughes, A-4301-18

In which we are reminded that any plan that involves robbing a convenience store to get money to go to a casino is a bad plan.

Gittens v. NJ Dept. of Corrections, A-3008-19

From the I Was Just Writing A Book department:

Petitioner, who has previously escaped prison "for a few hours" (yes, that is a quote), is charged with planning or attempting escape based on the following:

"[D]ocuments from his locked footlocker. The documents detailed personal information regarding DOC employees, including their full names, salaries, work schedules, overtime, and potential family members.

[...] detailed maps of the secured areas in the prison, the trailer area, the F-Unit, the cells located within the unit, DOC internal management procedures, and "dimensions of fences" surrounding the prison.

[...] documents containing "information related to when doors were opened, how long they were opened, when stand-up counts were called, where metal detectors were located, where frisk shacks were located, and numerous distances and measurements of areas within the jail."

[Paragraphination adjusted, internal brackets removed.]

Baburka v. State, A-4112-19

From the Why Did They Appeal That When There's Video department:

Plaintiff set off the metal detector going into a municipal court. She was thereafter frisked by a police officer. 

Plaintiff sued the township alleging that the police officer township squeezed her breasts during the frisk.

Township's summary judgment motion: The video of the frisk doesn't show any breast squeezing.

Trial Court: Correct. Summary judgment granted in favor of the township.

State v. Graham, A-2693-18

In a municipal court, the defendant in this case is told by an officer to remove his hoodie. Fine. No problem. He then is asked to remove his head covering. Defendant refuses. Defendant is directed by the judge to leave the courtroom. Defendant complies, escorted by the officer.

Outside, there is a fracas. The beginning is off-camera, but it ends on camera. The officer says he was assaulted by Defendant. Defendant says he was mauled by the officer. The officer and another officer who came to assist the first officer both testify to the officer's version. Defendant and his girlfriend testify to Defendant's version.

Previously, Defendant obtained a domestic violence restraining order against his girlfriend. Defendant had dismissed the order against his girlfriend before the trial. At trial, the prosecutor has a field day with the order when cross examining Defendant and his girlfriend.

The Appellate Division reverses, holding:

1. Regarding the girlfriend: References to the domestic violence restraining order should have been sanitized to 'a court order'.

2. Regarding Defendant: In an assault case where credibility is at issue, when someone is the victim of domestic violence, you can't falsely imply they committed domestic violence with your cross-examination questions.

3. Regarding the Court: Your curative instruction dealing with that false implication should not leave it ambiguous whether the witness has a domestic violence restraining order issued against him.

In Re Civil Commitment of M. F., A-2737-19

This case is a reminder that, when you have been involuntarily committed because you may be a danger and the court is about to make a decision whether to continue to keep you locked up, it is strongly advised that you do not engage in violence against your roommate.